





























































































































































































































































































































The following pages offer a contribution to the understanding of Keynes’s débuts as an
economist, in the hope we might dissipate a few myths, some created by Keynes himself, others
by disciples or adversaries. Following some preliminary remarks on these misunderstandings, we
will recall how Keynes became a professional economist, showing that he did not arrive to
economics by chance, that this was indeed a natural result of his early preoccupations and
thinking. But, even when he was a confirmed economist, economics remained secondary for
Keynes, after ethics and politics, and this until the end of his life. We will examine this in part
three of this paper, where we consider how Keynes viewed economics in the first decade of our
century. We will show that certain important themes in his economic reflections, his view of
laissez-faire in particular, are clearly present in early works, and that the methods he would later
apply to economic studies were built up at that date. In the last part of this paper, we will turn to
Keynes’s early theoretical economics, examining in particular his reflections on the quantity
theory of money, in his lectures notes. We will show that his position towards this theory -- at
least in its most simplified version -- was already somewhat critical at that early stage, drawing
on his philosophical and methodological views.
The evolution of Keynes’s economic thought is usually considered, using his own words,
as “a long struggle of escape” from the so-called “classical” orthodoxy. In the preface to the
French translation of the General Theory, dated February 1939, Keynes told his readers that his
book “registers my final escape from the confusions of the Quantity Theory, which once
entangled me” (JMK, vol. 7,1  xxxiv). For one of Keynes’s biographers, Robert Skidelsky, “the
                                                
* Correspondence may be addressed to Gilles Dostaler, Département des sciences économiques, Université du
Québec à Montréal, C. P. 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville, Montréal H3C 3P8, Québec, Canada. E-mail:
dostaler.gilles@uqam.ca. Unpublished Writings of J. M Keynes © The Provost and Scholars of King’s College,
Cambridge, 1998. I thank Jacqueline Cox for her reception and her help at the Modern Archive Centre of King’s
College Library. I acknowledge grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and
from the Fonds pour la formation des chercheurs et l’aide à la recherche (FCAR, Québec). I am grateful, for their
useful comments, to Robert Leonard, Donald Moggridge, Robert Skidelsky, Nancy Wulwick, and members of
diverse audiences to which previous versions of this paper were read. The usual caveat applies.
1 This is how we refer to the volumes of The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (1971-89). For the
unpublished manuscripts kept at King’s College Library, we use the reference numbers of the papers (see Ahistory of the Keynesian revolution is largely a story of Keynes’s escape from the quantity theory
of money. What is interesting to the student of Keynes’s thought is how little hint of escape there
was before the First World War. At Cambridge Keynes expounded the quantity theory with all
the fervour of the true believer” (Skidelsky 1983, 214). Milton Friedman considers that “Keynes
was a quantity theorist long before he was a Keynesian” (Friedman 1974, 159) and writes of “the
strictly quantity theory approach of his Tract on Monetary Reform” (Friedman 1969, 152). For
Hayek, Keynes, despite his radical rationalism, “as an economist . . . was, even at the time when
he achieved international fame, still an old-fashioned liberal. In his celebrated articles in the
Manchester Guardian Commercial in 1921 and 1922 he still believed in free trade, the
international gold standard, and the need for more saving” (Hayek 1995, 229). For Sayers, “The
young Keynes . . . is classical, in the sense in which he himself came to use the term” (Sayers
1972, 599).
This raises many questions. The first problem is of course the definition of what the
orthodoxy is from which Keynes escaped. Keynes himself constructed the classical theory to
which he contrasted his general theory, but that classical theory is something of a straw man. In
fact, the picture of economic thinking at the turn of the century is somewhat more complicated.
Marshall, Walras and Wicksell, for example, did not hold the same views on many important
questions. And even when we consider the single individual, it is often difficult to classify his
positions unambiguously. This is the case, in particular, for the economist who is often presented
as the principal representative of the orthodoxy from which Keynes liberated himself, Alfred
Marshall. A careful reading of Marshall’s writings gives the picture of a man who was himself far
from the classical orthodoxy described by Keynes.2 And of course, the orthodoxy in which
Keynes was brought up at the turn of the century was different from the one he was struggling
with in the 1930s. It also varied between countries. It is only after 1950 that a somewhat well-
defined “core” emerged.
Neither are things simple with regard to that important element of the classical tradition
attacked by Keynes, the quantity theory of money. Up to this day, there is no agreement on the
definition, significance and scope of what is considered one of the oldest economic theories. A
recent collection of essays (Blaug et alii 1995) is a good testimony to this. The identification of
classical theory and quantity theory can also be questioned. Laidler (1991) describes the
complexities in the evolution of the quantity theory of money between 1871 and 1914, showing
in particular that the relations between the gold standard and the quantity theory, which are
sometime presented as two components of the classical orthodoxy against which Keynes
                                                                                                                                                             
Catalogue of the Papers of John Maynard Keynes in King’s College Library, Cambridge, Cambridge: Chadwyck-
Healey, 1995).
2 See also Groenewegen (1995).revolted, are not necessarily harmonious.3 The two are in fact very different things, the first being
an organization, the second a theory. The quantity theory can as well coexist with flexible
exchange rates, as is shown for example in Friedman’s case.
There is, finally, the question of the evolution of Keynes’s thought, not only in economics,
but in his philosophical outlook, his world vision, his Weltanschauung. Here again, things are not
simple. In the massive literature on Keynes, many contradictory interpretations are given,
concerning in particular the evolution of Keynes’s philosophy, of his economics, of his political
vision, and of the links between these different dimensions. There are, in Keynes’s published and
unpublished writings, quotations to support many different interpretations. Such is the case with
all great thinkers. We interpret an oeuvre, “that vast mass of verbal traces left by an individual at
his death” (Foucault 1972, 24), with our lenses, our limitations, our prejudices and our vision, in
the same way that our interpretation of the history of ideas, in economics as elsewhere, is
influenced by our view on current issues.
Concerning Keynes, our reading grid emphasizes continuity, unity, and the close relations
between the different dimensions of his vision: philosophy, politics, economics. This unity --
which is of course not devoid of evolution, transformation or even contradictions -- does not stem
solely from Keynes’s own mind. It is part of a general atmosphere, an air du temps, and it
borrows from multiple and contradictory sources: his family environment, the “presuppositions
of Harvey Road”, the academic influences at Eton and Cambridge, Moore and the Apostles,
Bloomsbury.4
2. How Keynes Came to Economics
Reviewing Moggridge’s biography of Keynes, Richard Musgrave writes: “Thus it was by chance
rather than by design that Keynes happened into the field of economics” (Musgrave 1993, 1438-
9). This is a dangerous statement, the relationship between chance and design in human life being
a very complex one. Who can be sure of the nature of the path that has led one to where he is
today?  Moggridge himself does not draw the same conclusion from his observations of Keynes’s
readings and some writings in 1905, which “cast some doubt on the view that Maynard’s formal
study of economics was undertaken ‘out of indecision’ or that his exposure to economic theory
was limited” (Moggridge 1992, 95).
This is an explicit criticism of O’Donnell, who wrote that “Keynes’s first formal study of
economics was thus not taken with a professional economist’s career in mind, but out of
                                                
3 See also Bigg (1990), Bridel (1987), Eshag (1963), and Green (1992), the latter challenging the view that the
quantity theory of money is a necessary part of classical economic analysis.
4 See Harrod (1951), Moggridge (1992), Skidelsky (1983). See also Dostaler (1996).indecision” (O’Donnell 1989, 14). Skidelsky, recalling that Keynes became a teacher of
economics without a university degree in the subject, adds that “his reading was not extensive.
He started on Adam Smith only in 1910, and never became erudite in the literature, as Foxwell
was. His grasp of theory came not so much from reading about it as from working out the
problems for himself, and discussing them with others. In this way he acquired a firm
understanding of a fairly limited range of theory” (Skidelsky 1983, 206). For Hayek, “Widely
read as Keynes was in many fields, his education in economics was somewhat narrow. . . . I fear
it must be admitted that before he started to develop his own theories, Keynes was not a highly
trained or a very sophisticated economic theorist” (Hayek 1995, 241-2).
These are questionable statements. Maynard’s father, John Neville, was lecturer in logic and
political economy, author of The Scope and Method of Political Economy (1891), as well as of
many entries in the Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. He was a former pupil and friend of
Marshall, who asked him to read the manuscript and correct the proofs of his Principles of
Economics. Maynard was thus raised in a milieu in which economics occupied an important
place. Among the visitors to Harvey Road were Foxwell, Sidgwick, Wicksteed, Giffen and
Palgrave. Neville, who was an eager reader, might have guided his son in the economic literature,
among other areas. According to Moggridge, the posthumous third edition of Sidgwick’s
Principles of Political Economy (1901), of which Neville corrected the first edition’s proofs
(1883 -- the year of Keynes’s birth) is probably the first book on economics that Maynard read
(Moggridge 1992, 100). But we find, in the detailed lists of books that Maynard started recording
in 1896 (PP/34), books on history, philosophy, politics, which certainly contributed to form his
vision of economics.
Keynes had also been initiated by his father into practical economics. John Neville had
always kept detailed records of his revenues, expenses, savings, securities value, as of many other
things, such as his hours of work. He transmitted this habit to his son, asking him to keep records
of his expenses while studying at Eton. The young Keynes was managing his affairs carefully
and, for one who would later despise saving, was careful that his expenses did not exceed his
revenues, as shown by his diaries (PP/34-40). Very early also, he began to supervise the accounts
of others, of friends and organizations. He thus wrote to his father from Eton on 9 February 1902
that he had been elected to the committee of management of the school stores: “As far as I can
make out, I am elected chiefly as a person competent to check the financial affairs. I am finding
that like you when I am appointed to a committee I am invariably made to do all the work”.5 He
also got involved in political debates, at Eton, where he was elected to the Eton Society, and at
Cambridge, where he joined the Cambridge Union Society on his arrival and the University
                                                
5 This will remain invariably true until the end of Keynes’s life.Liberal Club soon after; he became president of the two associations. At the Liberal Club, he
spoke, among other things, on fiscal reform.
Of course, being good in accounts or interested in political debates does not make one an
economist. But this shows that the young Keynes was not only living in the aetheraeal and
unwordly universe of the Apostles. He was, so to speak, interested in a real world of which the
economic aspect was very important. His formal training in economics started in 1905 and was of
very short duration, at least by modern standards. At Eton from 1897 to 1902, he studied mainly
classics and mathematics. He came up to Cambridge in Michaelmas term of 1902, where he
prepared for the mathematical tripos. But reflections on economic questions already appear in
some of Keynes’s earliest papers, some of which were written while he was at Eton. They are
present in his first printed writing, dated 1903, a review of volume 7 of The Cambridge Modern
History, where we read, for example: “Questions of currency, the periodic mania for an inflated
paper issue, the problem of state banks, and the arrangement of the tariff have been, for a hundred
years, the main planks of the American politician’s platform” (JMK, vol. 11, 503).  Keynes was
at that time very interested by the tariffs question.
In June 1905, Keynes graduated as twelfth wrangler in the mathematics tripos. It was during
the summer of that year that he started in earnest to read “masses of economics”, as he wrote to
Lytton Strachey, on 8 July, adding: “From the latter I have discovered someone whom I had not
realised to be very good -- namely Jevons. I am convinced that he was one of the minds of the
century. He has the curiously exciting style of writing which one gets if one is good enough --
particularly in the ‘Investigations in Currency and Finance’, a most thrilling volume”. Reviewing
the Essays on Economics by H. Stanley Jevons, W. Stanley’s son, for The Cambridge Review (8
February 1906), he described the father as “amongst the foremost thinkers of the nineteenth
century” (JMK, vol. 11, 508).
On 20 July 1905, he wrote to Strachey: “I live a joyless, painless existence, rather interested
in Political Economy with nobody to talk to”. In fact, he was talking with Pigou; he even helped
the latter correct the proofs of his Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace. This was the
beginning of a long and tortuous relationship. On 8 September, back from a holiday in the Alps,
he was “in the midst of Political Economy again”. From a list of books read during the long
vacation of 1905 (UA/24), we can note: Marshall, Jevons, Bowley, Cassel, Bagehot, Bastable,
Ricardo, Edgeworth, Cournot, Pareto, Böhm-Bawerk.
In Michaelmas term of 1905, Keynes attended Alfred Marshall’s lectures.6 This is the origin
of the account according to which Keynes’s formal training in economics lasted eight weeks, the
length of a term in Cambridge. His notes and essays have been kept (UA/3/2).  The subjects of
                                                
6 On the relation between Marshall and Keynes, see Groenewegen (1996).Marshall’s lectures were: domestic values, foreign trade, capital, theory of interest,7 taxation,
public finance, modern business methods. There was a lecture on “the evils of speculation” and
another on the literature of finance, starting with Bodin. The first essay that Keynes wrote for
Marshall in October 1905 was on the construction of index numbers of general exchange value.
In one of his other essays, he had to answer the following question: “What causes govern
variations in the amount of employment in a country from decade to decade, assuming the
condition of foreign trade to remain nearly unchanged?”. As the second cause, Keynes lists: “The
extent of the prevalence of a speculative or gambling spirit or of an oversanguine outlook
exaggerating the booms and, in consequence, the subsequent depressions also”. As he always did
in his teaching, Marshall heavily annotated Keynes’s answers. In a questionnaire filled for
Marshall’s lectures on 12 October, Keynes wrote that he was interested in “Advanced Economics
mainly  analytic,” adding: “I am inclined to specialise on C. Money, Credit and Prices D.
International Trade”.8 On November 15, Keynes wrote to Strachey: “I find economics
increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it. I want to manage a railway or organise
a Trust or at least swindle the investing public. It is so easy and fascinating to master the
principles of these things”.9
Marshall, who did not succeed in managing Neville’s career as an economist,10 hoped for
better success with his son: “Marshall is continually pestering me to turn professional economist
and writes flattering remarks on my papers to help on the good cause. Do you think there’s
anything in it? I doubt it” (Letter to Strachey, 23 November 1905). Keynes finally chose the civil
service examination instead of the economics tripos established by Marshall a few years earlier.
He was ranked second this time and did “worst in the only two subjects of which I possessed a
solid knowledge -- Mathematics and Economics” (Letter to Strachey, 4 April 1906). From
October 1906 to July 1908, he worked as a civil servant at the India Office. In March 1907, he
was transferred to the Revenue, Statistics and Commerce Department. While in London, Keynes
also attended the Economic Club of University College, and he joined the Royal Economic
Society in 1907. His first scientific article, published in 1909 (JMK, vol. 11, 1-23), as well as his
first book, in 1913 (JMK, vol. 1), have as their object Indian finance, of which he got a close
knowledge while working at the India Office. His experience would also lead him to his
appointment on the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, in 1913. This is an
                                                
7 It included a study of the historical development of the theory of interest since the scholastics.
8 This document, which is not in Keynes’s papers, is quoted by Moggridge (1992), 95.
9 It is at that time that Keynes’s career as an investor began; his first acquisition was four shares in the Marine
Insurance Company bought on 6 July 1905.
10 Among other things, Neville Keynes turned down Marshall’s offer to edit the Economic Journal.instance of what would continue in all of Keynes’s writings in economics: a continuous
preoccupation with the practical problems with which he was concerned.
Keynes left the India Office after he was offered a lectureship in economics at Cambridge,
when Pigou succeeded Marshall in the political economy chair. Writing to his father about
Marshall’s proposal, on 21 April 1908, Keynes said “that I should have at once to learn a little
economics”. This must have been a humoristic statement by one who had already explored the
field, and knew very well how he intended to explore it further, as is shown by the following list
of works to be written (A/9), dated 30 January 1909, that month during which Keynes started
lecturing:11
Papers to be written
The ‘Long Run’ in Economics (The element of doubt in the determination of value)
The Indian Gold Standard Reserve
Proposals for an International Currency
Mathematical Notes on the Median
English Gold Reserves
The Logical Basis of the Theory of Correlation
A Plea for a New Official Index Number of Prices
The Riskless Rate of Interest
Monographs
The Method of Index Numbers
The Theory of Crises and Commercial Fluctuations
Treatises
The Principles of Probability
Methods of Statistics
Textbooks
                                                
11 On this, see O’Donnell 1992.The Principles of Money
The Mathematical Organon of Economics
At that time, the second version of the “Principles of Probability” was already written and
submitted to King’s College, where Keynes was elected fellow in March 1909.12 Written in April
1909, a long paper on index numbers (JMK, vol. 11, 49-156) obtained the Adam Smith Prize.
With heavy teaching and supervision assignments, Keynes was also writing profusely, in many
different styles for different audiences, as will be the case during all his life. His first applied
essay, geared to a large public, “Great Britain’s Foreign Investment”, was published in the New
Quarterly on February 1910 (JMK, vol. 15, 44-59). The first of his numerous “Letters to the
Editor” was published in The Economist in February 1909 (JMK, vol. 15, 18-9). He founded his
Political Economy Club on October 1909.13  He was appointed editor of the Economic Journal in
October 1911. At less than thirty years of age, Keynes was already at the centre of the economic
profession in England.
In one of his last Apostle papers, “The present position of metaphysics in the society”, read
on 29 May 1909, Keynes deplored the following change: “For the subject has become
professionalized -- like mathematics and political economy” (UA/33). He could have become a
professional philosopher or a professional mathematician. He became a professional economist;
and this was not by pure chance or in reaction to events. It was, of the three paths, the most
natural for Keynes to follow. The very quick start of his career as an economist was that of a
well-prepared sprinter. But we will now see that his vision of economics was not the one which
would become associated with the majority of professional economists. Paradoxically, economics
was then and would remain for the rest of his life secondary in his Weltanschauung.
3. How Keynes Viewed Economics14
Economics, Ethics and Money
At the end of “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren”, first published in October 1930,
Keynes wrote: “But, chiefly, do not let us overestimate the importance of the economic problem,
                                                
12 He was not elected following the submission of the first version, in December 1907.
13 “The day before yesterday I founded a Political Economy Club for the undergraduates and am to give an opening
presidential address on Wednesday” (Letter to Duncan Grant, 24 October 1909, quoted in Harrod 1951, 149). On the
constitution of the Club, see the documents in UA/6/15, dated October 1909. On the importance of this Club, until
the end of Keynes’s life, see Harrod (1951), 150-52, 327-30; Moggridge (1992), 188-90; Skidelsky (1983), 212-13.
14 See, for more developments of some elements of this section, Dostaler (1996).or sacrifice to its supposed necessities other matters of greater and more permanent significance.
It should be a matter for specialists -- like dentistry. If economists could manage to get
themselves thought of as humble, competent people, on a level with dentists, that would be
splendid!” (JMK, vol. 9, 332). Keynes surely did not consider himself a humble specialist. But
these remarks reflect a hierarchy that would remain his until the end of his life, where, in the
middle of his negociations for Bretton Woods and other businesses, he kept a close eye on the
affairs of the Committee for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts, which were for him what
was truly important in the long run. The opening of the Art’s Theatre of Cambridge, in February
1936, was an event of which he seemed as proud as the publication of the General Theory.
This hierarchy was set right from the beginning. It is often said that Keynes’s interest in
economics was more or less in contradiction with his “apostolic period” and in particular with his
praise of Moore’s Principia  Ethica. Thus Harrod (1951) stresses the unwordliness of
Bloomsbury and the Apostles. For Skidelsky, “Keynes, unlike Marshall, did not regard
economics as a ‘handmaiden of ethics’ -- it was not the activity through which his ethical beliefs
found expression. He was a follower of Moore, who had cut the links which for Marshall
connected economics to ethics” (Skidelsky 1983, 209). It appears to us that right from the
beginning, following his father, as well as Mill, Sidgwick and Marshall, Keynes viewed
economics as a moral science, subordinate to ethics and politics. Aristotle, of whom Keynes was
an enthusiastic reader,15 is most probably his earliest influence here. Later on, we find many
allusions to the relations between ethics and economics in Keynes’s lecture notes, and this is one
of the first subjects he submitted to discussion in his Political Economy Club. In notes for a talk
on the relation of economics to ethics, Keynes mentioned that it is very difficult to stick to a
strictly scientific point of view in economics, politics being always inserted in (UA/6/15). Of
course, Keynes came to economics also out of his concern with practical issues. But this path is
not so distant from that of philosophy and particularly of ethics. Ethics is linked to human
conduct, and human conduct is at the core of economic activity.
We also find an echo of Aristotle and his condemnation of chrematistics in the following
quote from “Economic Possibilities. . .” about the money-motive, the main motor of capitalist
economies, which Keynes hoped would disappear in a better future: “The love of money as a
possession -- as distinguished from the love of money as a means to the enjoyments and realities
of life -- will be recognised for what it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-
criminal, semi-pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in
                                                
15 “Have you ever read the Ethics of that superb Aristotle? the greatest of works and with few of the follies with
which all his commentators seem to credit him. There never was such good sense talked -- before or since” (Letter to
Strachey, 23 January 1906).mental disease” (JMK, vol. 9, 329).16 Contempt and condemnation of the love of money,
reflections on the fragility of all possessions, on the fleeting nature of wealth, are to the found in
Keynes’s early essays and Apostle papers, as well as in his lectures, where he notes, for example
that “The ethical value of wealth is not easily justified unless we regard the present state of affairs
as purely transitional” (UA/6/15).
Keynes, of course, made a lot of money and felt comfortable with this. To Lytton Strachey,
who was asked to join the staff of the Spectator, and was tortured by this decision, Keynes wrote,
on 5 July 1907: “I think you are probably right to accept the Spectator. It is hardly possible to
overestimate the importance of money”. But money was for him a means to live a good life,
exemplified by the way of living of the “Bloomsberries”, to help his impecunious friends and to
patronize art.
Laissez-Faire
As we noted in the introduction, Keynes is considered, by some interpreters, to have been an
“old-fashioned liberal” until the 1920s. The End of Laissez-Faire, published in 1926, would thus
appear as  one of the first frontal attacks against a doctrine of which he was previously a partisan.
In the General Theory, according to this view, he would then have given a rationalization for this
condemnation of laissez-faire. We do not agree with this widely-held interpretation.
Condemnation of laissez-faire is present in Keynes’s first writings, even before the Apostle
period, as well as it is a theme of the first published paper he recorded in a list that he started in
1908, a review article of a study of social and industrial problems in West Ham, written by E. G.
Howarth and M. Wilson: “Anyone who is interested in the effect which unbridled individualism
and laissez-faire in such matters may have on the development of a community should turn to the
account given in this volume of the doings of swarms of small builders, working with little or no
capital for immediate profits, and unhindered by bye-laws or by an ordered scheme of
development” (JMK, vol. 11, 174).
 In early essays, written at the beginning of the century, Keynes praised great intellects such
as Abélard (UA/16) and Bernard de Cluny (PP/33), who rejected the religious orthodoxies of
their time, but he criticized “their complete acceptance of the fact of misery, of pessimism with
regard to this life, without any corresponding Joblike outburst against deity for permitting it, or
any theological doctrine explaining and excusing him” (PP/33). This would become a crucial idea
in Keynes’s later work and action. Misery, poverty, unemployment are unacceptable on ethical
                                                
16  There is here, in the late twenties, a Freudian connection, which is absent in the period under survey. It is in the
1920s that Keynes became familiar with Freud’s writings. On this see Dostaler (1997).grounds.17 They are also dangerous on political grounds, revolutions, destructive of civilization,
originating from these situations. Moreover, they are inefficient on an economic ground. Being
man-made evils, rising from an inefficient organization, they can be eradicated by political
action.
These ideas are developed in Keynes’s essay on Burke, written in 1904 (UA/20/3), where
we find his first elaborate argument against the doctrine of laissez-faire, which Burke borrowed
from Adam Smith. A contemporary of Smith, Burke was “the earliest advocate of its principles in
the House of Commons”. Keynes accepted many of Burke’s ideas, his doctrine of expediency in
particular, and the fact that there are no ultimate ends in politics. Politics is a doctrine of means,
to procure the well-being of people. Keynes was also sensitive to some of Burke’s arguments
against self-government: the fact that those he would later call “more or less illiterate voters”
(JMK, vol. 9, 295) were not able to understand their real interests, and that an intellectual elite --
of which he surely considered himself a representative -- was best able to deal with their
problems. But Keynes was very critical of Burke’s economics, “dominated by laisser-faire”, and
condemned his justification of inequalities:
But he certainly holds that there is a point beyond which no individual ought to be
interfered with on any pretext whatever, and that there are certain spheres, in particular
those of property and commerce, which ought, absolutely and without exception, to be left
to individual action. (UA/20/3, 20)
Most defenders of the rights of property are ready to admit the evils of a very unequal
distribution; but this difficulty caused Burke no qualms. He declared that no alternative
distribution would produce any appreciable increase of good, and urged that it is of the
essential nature of property to be unequal. This is a line of argument of which Burke is
overfond and which leads him into more than one fallacious position. (ibid., 22-3)
According to a testimony by Sheppard recalled by Harrod, Keynes, who “was violently
opposed to laissez-faire” proposed the following definition of conservatives and liberals in a
speech at a Liberal meeting while he was undergraduate: “let there be a village whose inhabitants
were living in conditions of penury and distress; the typical Conservative, when shown this
village, said, ‘It is very distressing, but, unfortunately, it cannot be helped;’ the Liberal said:
‘Something must be done about this.’ That was why he was a Liberal” (Harrod 1951, 192). One
                                                
17 Of course, poverty was central to the monastic ideal. Skidelsky (1992, 64-6) argues that Keynes had more nuanced
views about the ethical value of suffering. See O’Donnell (1997) for a criticism of Skidelsky’s interpretation.must notice here that the term conservative is used as synonymous with partisan of laissez-faire,
while a liberal is opposed to it, and believes that State action should be used to cure the effects of
“unbridled individualism and laissez-faire”. There is of course a semantic difficulty here, as
liberal is also used, in particular in French speaking countries, in the first sense. But even in
English language countries, opponents to State intervention and modern partisans of laissez-faire,
such as Friedman and Hayek, considering themselves as authentic liberals, condemn as a kind of
semantic kidnapping the use of liberal in what we could call the Keynesian sense. In the 1920s,
Keynes used the expression of “new liberalism” to qualify his own brand of liberalism, opposed
to laissez-faire. Of course, this new liberalism is completely opposed to what is often called today
“neoliberalism”, being the resurgence of the classical liberalism, associated with laissez-faire.18
But even that association must be qualified in some ways. The liberalism of some of those whom
Keynes qualified as “classical economists” in the General Theory, in particular Marshall and
John Stuart Mill, is grounded on ethics, and very critical of traditional laissez-faire. Even the
position of Adam Smith is much more subtle than what his modern neoliberal disciples pretend.19
One must thus be very careful with these words, in particular when they are heavily loaded with
ideological content.
The Methods of Economics
Economics deals with human beings in history. It deals with volition, intention, pulsion. This is
why, according to Keynes, it can be described as a moral science: “I also want to emphasise
strongly the point about economics being a moral science. I mentioned before that it deals with
introspection and with values. I might have added that it deals with motives, expectations,
psychological uncertainties” (Letter to Harrod, 16 July 1938, in JMK, vol. 14, 300). In his 1937
Quarterly Journal of Economics article, Keynes writes: “Actually, however, we have, as a rule,
only the vaguest idea of any but the most direct consequences of our acts. . . . Thus the fact that
our knowledge of the future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders wealth a peculiarly
unsuitable subject for the methods of the classical economy theory” (JMK, vol. 14, 113).
Again, this is a theme that is present right from the start in Keynes’s reflections. In his
Burke paper, Keynes tells us that he agrees with the latter when he says that reform must not be
violent, and more generally that we must not sacrifice present well-being for doubtful advantages
in the future. One of the reasons is that “our powers of prediction are slight, our command over
remote results infinitesimal”. This echoes Moore’s reflections in chapter five of Principia Ethica,
                                                
18 See Beaud and Dostaler (1995), chapter 7. Freeden (1986) questions Keynes’s “new liberalism”.
19 See the famous piece by Viner (1927). In the more recent literature, see Fitzgibbons (1995) and Ross (1995).entitled “Ethics in Relation to Conduct”.20 One of Keynes’s important Apostle paper (UA/19/2)
is a comment of this chapter.21 But this stream of thought predates the reading of Moore by
Keynes. It is to be found in Keynes’s first essays, concerning historical subjects, where rejection
of determinism, of the existence of natural laws in history, is linked to “that uncertainty in events
which baffles alike the historian, who studies the past, the politician who watches the present,
and the statesman whose eyes are on the future” (PP/31/3).
Thus the methods that need to be applied to the study of society, and in particular to
economics, cannot be of the same nature as those applied to the natural world. Keynes’s work on
the logical foundation of probability, of which the first elements can be found in his Apostle
papers dealing with Moore’s Principia  Ethica, is closely linked to the elaboration of the methods
that would later be used in his economic work. Written in 1907, the first version of his
“Principles of Probability” contains the following passage:
The old hope, which sustained many investigators in the course of the nineteenth century,
of gradually bringing the moral sciences under the sway of mathematical reasoning,
steadily recedes -- if we mean, as they meant, by mathematics the introduction of precise
numerical methods. The old assumptions, that all quantity is numerical and that all
quantitative characteristics are additive, can no longer be sustained. Mathematical
reasonings now appears as an aid in its symbolic rather than in its numerical character.
(TP/A/1-2, 358-9)22
In his controversy with the statistician Pearson, in 1910-11,23 about the effects of parental
alcoholism on children, Keynes writes that statistical methods “need applying with much more
care and caution than is here exhibited before they are suited to the complex phenomena with
which economists have to deal” (JMK, vol. 11, 205). Already in a 1905 Apostle paper,
“Miscellanea Ethica” (UA/21), Keynes mentions the “difficulties in the pure theory of
economics” linked to the question of “organic unities”. Utility belongs to that class of qualities
                                                
20 “But it is quite certain that our causal knowledge is utterly insufficient to tell us what different effects will
probably result from two different actions, except within a comparatively short space of time; we can certainly only
pretend to calculate the effects of actions within what may be called an ‘immediate’ future” (Moore 1993, 202).
21 There is a controversy on the dating of this paper. According to Skidelsky, it has been read to the Apostles on 23
January 1904 (1983, 152). According to Moggridge, it was written about three year later (1992, 131-6). There is no
date on Keynes’s manuscript.
22 This passage appears verbatim in the published version, except for the deletion of the word “old” before “hope” at
the beginning, and the addition of the following sentence at the end: “I, at any rate, have not the same lively hope as
Condorcet, or even as Edgeworth, ‘éclairer les Sciences morales et politiques par le flambeau de l'Algèbre’” (JMK,
vol. 8, 349; French in original)
23 Which prefigures the controversy with Tinbergen, at the end of the 1930s, about the statistical measurement of
business cycle theories (JMK, vol. 14, 285-320).for which the “value of a whole” is independant from the value of the parts, contrary to what is
the case for most physical measurements. Despite his appreciation of Jevons, quoted earlier, it is
clear that Keynes is very far from Jevons’s methodological position. Jevons, who was convinced
of the mathematical character of the new science of economics, was also convinced that the laws
that we derive for individuals are also applicable to society, considered as the sum of individuals.
There has been an ongoing debate since the beginning of the 1980s on the nature and
evolution of Keynes’s philosophy, and on its connection to his economics, which we have no
space to enter here.24 Some see in Keynes an idealist, others a realist; some an empiricist, others a
rationalist; some an essentialist, others an existentialist. The truth is maybe that Keynes is, in
philosophy as in politics, a man of the middle ground, a pragmatist, critical of all dogmatisms.
Clearly, for him, there was not one infallible recipe that could be applied at all times to all kinds
of problems. This is analogous to Marshall’s position, who speaks of himself in this way to
Foxwell, while referring to John Neville’s Scope and Method of Political Economy: “As regards
method I regard myself mid-way between Keynes + Sidgwick + Cairnes and Schmoller +
Ashley” (Letter of 30 January 1897 quoted in Moggridge 1992, 17). Here is how Keynes
describes his teacher in his obituary article, which resembles a methodological manifesto and a
self-portrait:
The master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts. He must reach a high
standard in several different directions and must combine talents not often found together.
He must be mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher -- in some degree. He must
understand symbols and speak in words. He must contemplate the particular in terms of the
general, and touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of thought. He must study the
present in the light of the past for the purposes of the future. No part of man’s nature or his
institutions must lie entirely outside his regard. He must be purposeful and disinterested in
a simultaneous mood; as aloof and incorruptible as an artist, yet sometimes as near the
earth as a politician. Much, but not all, of this ideal many-sidedness Marshall possessed.
But chiefly his mixed training and divided nature furnished him with the most essential and
fundamental of the economist’s necessary gifts -- he was conspicuously historian and
mathematician, a dealer in the particular and the general, the temporal and the eternal, at
the same time. (JMK, vol. 10, 173-4)
                                                
24 Some of the main contributions are Bateman (1996), Carabelli (1988), Davis (1994), Fitzgibbons (1988), Mini
(1994), O’Donnell (1989). Many of the important journal articles are collected in Wood (1994): see in particular the
papers by Alvay, Bateman, Davis, De Finetti, Dow, Favereau, Felix, Foster, Hamouda, Mini, O’Donnell, Rotheim,
Runde, Smithin and Winslow.4. Keynes’s Early Monetary Thought
Keynes’s first series of lectures, in Lent term 1909, was entitled “Money, credit and prices”. The
opening sentence of his first lecture, given on January 19, was: “I propose to deal first of all with
the pure theory of money”, after which he went on to examine carefully the four functions of
money as medium of exchange, common measure of value, standard of value and store of value
(UA/6/1/2). His lecture notes from the years between 1909 and 1923 are still extant, and
catalogued in 25 subsections as UA/6.  Of these, UA/6/5-6, entitled “Notes for a series first given
in Michaelmas term 1910 as ‘Theory of money’” have been published in JMK, vol. 12, 722-83;
and UA/6/7, first section of “Notes for a series first given in Michaelmas term 1911 as ‘Principles
of economics’”, also in JMK, vol. 12, 690-722. It is not easy to document the evolution of
Keynes’s thought over the years. For example, in notes dated before 1914, there is an extract of
Pigou’s 1917 article, which meant that Keynes reused and reworked his notes, as do most
teachers.25 But some leitmotives can nevertheless be found in these notes, both published and
unpublished.
In the first place, Keynes regularly repeats that the quantity theory of money is obvious and
true, as he will later repeat as well in his Tract on Monetary Reform. This is often a basis for the
oft-repeated statement that Keynes was an enthusiastic proponent of the quantity theory before
the War and until sometime after the publication of the Tract: “The doctrine that a value of a unit
of currency tends to vary inversely with the volume of currency, subject to proper qualifications,
as it will be enunciated in this lecture, is surely obvious and certain. . . . The theory is true in just
the same way as it is true that the day’s temperature varies with the length of the day, other things
being equal” (UA/6/22).26
The example quoted above, which often appears in Keynes’s notes, is borrowed from
Marshall’s evidence before the Royal Commission on Indian Currency, where the latter said: “I
hold that prices vary directly with the volume of currency, if other things are equal; but other
things are constantly changing. This so-called ‘quantity theory of the value of money’ is true in
just the same way as it is true that the day’s temperature varies with the length of the day, other
things being equal; but other things are seldom equal” (Marshall 1926, 267).
The qualification at the end of Marshall’s quotation is of course very important, as Keynes
himself reiterates in numerous places in his notes: “But other things seldom are equal; and these
                                                
25 Skidelsky writes of the lecture notes published in the Collected Writings that “they have been stitched together by
the editor from different years, ranging from 1910 to 1914, making it difficult to pinpoint changes in presentation
over period” (1983, 217). But an examination of the notes seem to show that it is Keynes himself who arranged them
in this way.
26 See also UA/6/1 and UA/6/12.other things are very often, perhaps generally, more important than the changes in the volume of
the currency. . . . That is to say, the level of prices depends upon a number of independant factors,
and will vary if any of these factors change. The quantity of money is only one of them”
(UA/6/22).
Of these other factors, one of the most important is the proportion of their wealth that
individuals wish to keep in the form of ready purchasing power. This is already developed in
Marshall’s 1871 manuscript on money, which Keynes knew. One can see there the origins of a
behavioural analysis of the demand for money that is considered as an asset, alternative to others:
the so-called portfolio approach to money. This is of course the Cambridge cash-balance
approach that found one of its first explicit statements in Pigou’s 1917 article.
This article was published after Fisher’s Purchasing Power of Money, the first edition of
which appeared in 1911. There Fisher developed the alternative transactions approach, stressing
the role of the velocity of money. Keynes wrote a review of Fisher’s book, mentioning, as Pigou
did in his later article, the equivalence of Fisher’s and Marshall’s presentations, but criticizing the
absence of an analysis of a transmission mechanism of money to prices via the interest rate,
which was being developed in the Cambridge tradition: “the most serious defect in Professor
Fisher’s doctrine is to be found in his account of the mode by which through transitional stages
an influx of new money affects prices” (JMK, vol. 11, 376).27 But Keynes would use Fisher as
much as Marshall, and later Pigou, in his lecture notes. Fisher also stresses the variability of the
velocity of money, as well as of the volume of trade:  “We must distinctly recognize that the
quantity of money is only one of three factors, all equally important in determining the price
level” (Fisher 1922, 21). A careful reading of Fisher’s book shows that one cannot identify the
quantity theory with the equation of exchange, and that Fisher is often more concerned with the
short-run real effects of money than with the long-run neutrality.
Thus the numerous qualifications to what we could call a naïve conception of the quantity
theory of money that we find in Keynes’s lecture notes follow those already stressed by Marshall
and Fisher. But Keynes goes further, and there are other qualifications. One is inspired by his
prize-winning paper on index numbers in 1909, itself clearly stemming from his work on
probability, which has its origins in his reflections on Moore and in the question of organic
unities. It concerns methodological problems related to the nature of economic quantities and the
problems of measurement. Of the problems of measurement, to which a chapter of the General
Theory will be devoted, Keynes writes in his paper on index numbers: “The quantities in
economics in connection with which difficulties of measurement arise, either from the nature of
                                                
27 The transmission mechanism was in fact already discussed by Henry Thornton and many other nineteenth century
English economists.the subject or from the lack of statistics, are very numerous” (JMK, vol. 11, 55). This is
particularly the case with prices: “The contradiction arises out of the very fundamental
characteristic of the price relation, not always recognised, that it is not, in the fullest and strictest
sense, numerically measurable” (ibid., 57); and even more so with the general price level: “After
first arguing that general exchange value, defined as an ensemble of particular exchange values, is
generally incapable of measurement . . .” (ibid., 95). This idea is already present in Keynes’s
1909 article on India, the writing of which precedes the writing of his essay on index numbers, an
article which is often presented as a vindication of the naïve quantity theory. Of course, we read
there that in India “the available statistics appear to show that, whether the phenomena are
connected or not, the rise of prices has been nearly proportional to the increase of currency”, but
Keynes adds that “too much reliance must not be placed upon their remarkable agreement” (JMK,
vol. 11, 8).28
This is linked to the problem of inductive inference. For Keynes, it is not possible to prove
or disprove empirically the quantity theory of money: “The inductive verification of such a theory
is evidently difficult. We cannot isolate the various contributory causes, or prepare experiments.
It is, therefore, always difficult to refute a controversialist who points to one of the possible
causes as the sole cause of what has occurred” (UA/6/22; emphasis in original).29 This goes quite
contrary to the current idea according to which the controversies in economics could be settled by
empirical tests: “The inductive verifications of the adherent of the [quantity] theory have been, I
think, nearly as fallacious as those of its opponents” (JMK, vol. 12, 765). This is why the great
debates, beginning with the Bullionist controversy up to this day (in fact, it started some centuries
ago with the debate between Bodin and Malestroit, and later Hume and Montesquieu), are so
inconclusive. They are also closely linked to political considerations. Keynes was well aware of
these debates, and they are present in his notes. For example, the allusion to Montesquieu is not
an unimportant and passing remark added to please the French readers of The General Theory.
He was then already studying and explaining Montesquieu’s ideas.
There remains other significant problems. It is in these lectures, and not in 1923, that
Keynes says for the first time that the quantity theory of money is only valid in the long run, and
thus not very useful to treat many pressing economic and political problems: “It is true, of course,
that we must nearly always add the qualification ‘in the long run’; but when the long run is a very
long run, so long that the ultimate event cannot be foreseen, the doctrine loses most of its
                                                
28 Keynes reviewed Mises’s Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel (1912) in 1914 (JMK, vol. 11, 400-3), but
did not seem to notice that some of Mises’s ideas on measurement had some similarity with his own views.
29 See also JMK, vol. 12, 701.importance” (JMK, vol. 12, 752).30 He also says that the theory is only perfectly valid for the
world considered as a whole, which still restricts its utility: “The Quantity Theory is only useful
for determining the level of prices for the world as a whole” (UA/6/11). Finally, Keynes develops
the idea that the quantity theory must be considerably qualified by the introduction of credit. His
second set of notes dealt with credit, of which he wrote: “When the subject of money was new to
me, the nature of credit seemed extremely mysterious. Command of credit seemed to constitute
wealth and yet to be created out of nothing” (UA/6/2).
Thus it was already apparent that for Keynes the quantity theory was not  a very useful
engine of analysis. Keynes was already thinking about the explanation of depressions and booms
along different lines of investigation, appearing for example in his paper presented to the London
Political Economy Club’s meeting of 3 December 1913, “How Far are Bankers Responsible for
the Alternations of Crisis and Depression?” (JMK, vol. 13, 2-14). The role of speculation is
stressed, in one of his very first lectures, as are its links with uncertainty and ignorance (UA/6/4).
5. Conclusion
This paper has focused on one aspect of Keynes’s life and work, within a limited span of time:
his formation as an economist before the First World War and some of his first reflections on
economics. We challenged the view according to which Keynes came to economics by chance,
and that until the beginning of his career in this profession, economics was essentially a foreign
territory. But we also stressed that, paradoxically, even when he was a confirmed economist,
economics remained, for Keynes, a secondary concern, subject to the more fundamental
dimensions of human existence, of ethics and politics. We showed that some of his most
important positions on economics, like his views on laissez-faire, were already clearly present at
the beginning of the century. We also indicated that the methods that Keynes applied to
economics, as late as in the General Theory and after, are elaborated in his philosophical
reflections of the first decade of the century. Although it remains open to debate, this conclusion
emerges from much of the recent work by scholars of Keynes. We ended by considering one
aspect of theoretical economics, which became, from the start, an important topic in Keynes’s
lectures and writings, the quantity theory of money. We showed that Keynes had already
developed a critical attitude towards this theory -- or at least towards the more naïve
interpretations of it -- before the War, when he is usually considered to have been an orthodox
economist. In the period surveyed, Keynes’s position, of course, was far from his later
                                                
30 Commenting on the same passage, O’Donnell writes: “It will also not escape attention that Keynes’s concerns in
his early lectures uncover some vital seeds for the revolutionary analysis of The General Theory and the 1937
Quarterly Journal of Economics article” (O’Donnell 1992, 773).explanation of unemployment. The experience of the first World War would modify his vision.
Persistent unemployment in England in the 1920s, followed by the world depression of the
1930s, would stimulate the development of the theory of effective demand. But this is another
story, which has already been the subject of numerous studies.
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